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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DOES
ONE SIZE FIT ALL?
George A. Hisert*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the basic premises of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) is conveyed by its name: the "Commercial Code" should be
"uniform" throughout the United States. Uniformity promotes com-
merce by standardizing and streamlining the process by which com-
mercial parties negotiate, conclude, and enforce contracts. The ability
of businesspeople, lawyers, and courts to address issues arising in in-
terstate commerce from the same common conceptual perspective
with the same set of rules is a vast improvement over the situation that
would prevail if there were fifty or more disparate sets of commercial
laws throughout the United States.
In contrast, one of the basic precepts of federalism is the individ-
ual state's ability to experiment with alternative solutions to problems
commonly shared with other states and to address those which may
not exist in other states. My purpose is to discuss the interplay be-
tween the uniformity the UCC imposes and the desire for experimen-
tation on a local basis. This Essay argues that the UCC, by creating
the ability to balance the competing interests of uniformity and local
flexibility, maintains a strong substantive advantage over encroaching
federal legislation. The issues are discussed both generally and in the
context of UCC section 5-114, which permits injunctive relief against
fraudulent draws on letters of credit.'
* Partner at Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison in San Francisco. At the time of writing,
Mr. Hisert was chair of the Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the Business Law
Section of the California State Bar and its Letter of Credit Subcommittee. He is also the
liaison from the American Bar Association's Section on Business Law to the Permanent
Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code and chair of the Task Force on Govern-
mentally Mandated Forms of Letters of Credit of the American Bar Association's Subcom-
mittee on Letters of Credit. He has taken an active role in the current revisions to UCC
Article 5 and, to a lesser extent, Articles 2, 8, and 9. The views expressed herein are those
of the Author and are not necessarily those of any of the above organizations.
1. U.C.C. § 5-114 (1990).
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II. How UNIFORM Is THE UCC?
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) promulgated the UCC in 19512 and presented it to
each state legislature as a unit composed of nine separate articles.
3
The District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, and every state except
Louisiana4 have adopted this version.- The UCC is one of many uni-
form acts the NCCUSL has promulgated. Others include the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act,6 the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act,7 the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code,8 the Uniform Controlled Substances
Act,9 the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act,10 the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act,1" the Uniform Foreign
Money-Claims Act, 2 the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,' 3 the Uni-
form Parentage Act,'4 and the Uniform Probate Code,"5 just to name
a few of approximately 100 uniform acts currently in effect. From the
perspective of widespread adoption by almost every state, the UCC's
success has been exemplary.'
6
A. Official Variations
1. Official alternatives
Even in the original UCC, a number of local options enabled in-
dividual states to choose from several alternative formulations. 7
2. 1 U.L.A. xv (1989). Uniform Laws Annotated is an excellent collection of the pri-
mary uniform acts, annotated to show the nonuniform variations in each state.
3. See id. at xx.
4. Louisiana has since adopted major portions of the UCC in its revised form. Table
of Jurisdictions Listing Uniform Acts Adopted, in Directory of Uniform Acts and Codes
U.L.A. 9, 31 & n.1 (1994 Pamphlet).
5. See id. at 9-73.
6. UNiF. LIMrrED PARTNERSHIP Acr, 6 U.L.A. 561 (1969 & Supp. 1994).
7. UNiF. TRANSFER TO MINORS AcT, 8B U.L.A. 497 (1969 & Supp. 1994).
8. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDrr CODE, 7 U.L.A. 579 (1985).
9. UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES AcT, 9 U.L.A. 1, pt. 2 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
10. UNF. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY AcT, 8A U.L.A. 309 (1993).
11. UNrF. FOREIGN MoNEY-JUDGrMENTs REcoGNMON AC, 13 U.L.A. 261 (1986 &
Supp. 1994).
12. UNiP. FORmroN MONEY-CLAIMS ACe, 13 U.L.A. 42 (Supp. 1994).
13. UN. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AC, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985 & Supp. 1994).
14. UNIF. PARENTAGE AC, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1987 & Supp. 1994).
15. UNIw. PROBATE CODE, 8 U.L.A. 1 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
16. See Table of Jurisdictions Adopting Uniform Acts Listed, in Directory of Uniform
Acts and Codes U.L.A. 9, 9-73 (1994 Pamphlet).
17. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-318 (third-party beneficiaries of warranties express or im-
plied), 3-121 (instruments payable at bank), 5-114(4)(5) (certain payments on letters of
credit), 6-106 (application of proceeds from bulk sales), 9-401 (place of filing of UCC fi-
nancing statements), 9-407 (information from UCC filing officers) (1951). These do not
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Some were driven by a sense of political necessity. For instance, the
alternatives offered in section 9-401 requiring local filing of UCC
financing statements, as opposed to a central filing system within the
state, resulted from the concern that local filing offices might lose
significant revenues in those states where local filing had been the tra-
dition.18 Even though these "uniform" alternatives created
nonuniformity among the states, there was uniformity among the
states which adopted the same alternatives.
2. Official revisions
Many of the original nine articles have undergone substantial re-
vision as a result of the NCCUSL's official amendments. These
amendments have generally been promulgated on an article-by-article
basis. Several articles have undergone several sets of revisions. In
addition, new Articles 2A and 4A have been added to the original
nine. As of January 1, 1994, none of the revised or new articles had
been adopted by all of the jurisdictions that adopted the original
UCC, even though the NCCUSL actively seeks to persuade state leg-
islatures to adopt the most recently promulgated version of each arti-
cle.19 Moreover, in coming years major revisions to Articles 2, 5, 8,
and 9 will exacerbate the disparity among the states as a result of de-
lay in their adoption. It is possible that given sufficient time-and a
cessation of further revisions-each jurisdiction will have the same
version of each article of the UCC. As a practical matter, however,
this is unlikely to happen in the near or midterm future.
Notwithstanding the variations described above, I will label as
"uniform" any section of the UCC in effect in a state if it is identical
to any edition of an official UCC text, including any of the official
alternatives.
B. Local Variations
When various jurisdictions adopted the original UCC and subse-
quent official revisions, they also adopted local variations not included
in the official text. Local interest groups such as state bar organiza-
tions and law revision commissions promoted the variations, because
they believed that portions of the uniform version were not appropri-
include the numerous places where the official text contains blanks to be completed for
dollar amounts, references to other statutes, and the like.
18. Id. § 9-401.
19. New Article 4A and the 1977 revisions to Article 8 are approaching full enactment
in all jurisdictions.
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ate for local consumption or, in some cases, even for national con-
sumption. Some of these variations might be deemed "good" and
others "bad." However, since the local groups pushing for a particular
variation undoubtedly believed that their variation was good, such
characterizations are necessarily in the eyes of the beholder.
Some states have been more prolific than others in their varia-
tions.20 Some local variations evidence a rejection of significant por-
tions of the NCCUSL's work product. The need to address discrete
local issues was responsible for other variations. Still others were at-
tempts to fine tune individual sections. The result is that, even given
the broad definition of uniformity described above, the UCC is far
from uniform throughout the United States.
The following is a partial list of some of the more significant vari-
ations, arranged in order of appearance in the UCC and not in order
of significance.21
1. Section 5-102: Letters of credit and the Uniform Customs and
Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) (New York)
New York, Alabama, and Missouri24 have added a subsection
(4) to section 5-102 which essentially ousts Article 5 dealing with let-
ters of credit if the UCP is incorporated into a letter of credit. The
rationale, as understood by this Author, is that the New York banking
community did not feel that the NCCUSL's original efforts on Article
5 were satisfactory. This particular concern has caused the current
drafting committee for the revisions to Article 5 to consult closely
with the New York banking community in an attempt to address these
concerns and the New York variation on section 5-102.
2. Section 5-114: Injunctions and letters of credit (California)
The official text of section 5-114(2)(b) permits a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction to enjoin an issuer from honoring a letter of credit if
there is "fraud, forgery or other defect not apparent on the face of the
documents."'  California felt that this exception to the issuer's obliga-
tion to pay a complying draw on the letter of credit did violence to the
20. California, in particular, has had a tradition of believing, rightly or wrongly, that it
could improve upon the work of the NCCUSL. See infra part II.B.2-6.
21. Most of the examples are from California because of California's propensity for
deviating from the uniform version and because the Author practices in California.
22. N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & lEGs. tit. 11, § 79.2 (1994).
23. ALA. CODE § 7-5-102(4) (1993).
24. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.5-102(4) (Vernon 1994).
25. U.C.C. § 5-114 (1990).
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independence principle.26 Accordingly, California did not adopt the
language in section 5-114(2)(b) dealing with injunctions. As discussed
below, a variation on this particular issue may result in continuing lack
of uniformity in California with regard to injunctions against letters of
credit under the proposed revisions to Article 5.
3. Article 6: Bulk sales (California)
California's original version of Article 6 on bulk sales varied sig-
nificantly from the official version.27 Among other things, notice to
creditors (other than tax authorities) was by publication and recorda-
tion and not by direct mail. 8 Subsequent revisions to California's Ar-
ticle 6 imposed detailed escrow provisions in certain circumstances.
2 9
Even when the revised Article 6, promulgated by the NCCUSL in
1989, was adopted by California in 1990,30 numerous local variations
continued.
4. Section 9-102(4): Inventory of a retail merchant (California)
California's original version of section 9-102(4) provided that a
nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interest could not be
taken in the inventory of a retail merchant. 1 This was a major depar-
ture from the philosophy of the uniform Article 9, causing surprise
and consternation to out-of-state lenders. Although the prohibition
on security interests in the inventory of retail merchants has been sig-
nificantly narrowed, it has not been eliminated.32 Security interests in
the inventory of most retail merchants can now be obtained, but se-
cured parties must tread their way carefully through the provisions of
California's sections 9102(4), (5), (6), and (7).
5. Section 9-302: Deposit accounts (California)
Security interests in deposit accounts are excluded from the offi-
cial version of Article 933 However, California specifically included
security interests in deposit accounts within the scope of its Article
26. See CAL. COM. CODE § 5114 cmt. 6 (West 1964).
27. See, e.g., CAL. COM. CODE Div. 6 (Bulk Transfers) introductory cmt. (West. 1964).
28. See id § 6107.
29. See CAL. COM. CODE § 6106.1 (added by Act of Aug. 21, 1978, ch. 490, § 5, 1978
Cal. Stat. 1619, 1621-22, and amended by Act of July 24, 1979, ch. 294 § 5, 1979 Cal. Stat.
1094, 1097-98, and Act of July 27, 1979, ch. 373, § 53, 1979 Cal. Stat. 1250, 1269-70).
30. Id. § 6101 cmt.
31. Id. § 9102(4) (West 1964), amended by CAL. COM. CODE § 9102(4)-(7) (West 1990).
32. CAL COM. CODE § 9102(4)-(7) (West 1990).
33. U.C.C. § 9-302 (1990).
November 1994]
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9.34 Several other jurisdictions adopted California's version,35 with
still further local variation in some cases. The apparent lack of
problems encountered in California and other states with such secur-
ity interests, as compared to common-law methods of obtaining a lien
on deposit accounts, 36 has prompted a debate as to whether security
interests in deposit accounts should be included in the proposed revi-
sions to Article 9.37
6. Section 9-313: Fixtures (California)
Originally, California did not adopt section 9-313, primarily be-
cause of concern over its interplay with unusual features of Califor-
nia's real property law.38 In 1980, however, the California State Bar's
UCC Committee proposed and California adopted a variation of sec-
tion 9-313. The committee, of which the Author was a member at the
time the proposal was drafted, felt that the California version was a
significant improvement over the official version of section 9-313.
7. Section 9-401: Place of filing (Louisiana)
When Louisiana finally adopted Article 9, it included a local vari-
ation pursuant to which UCC financing statements could be filed in
the local filing office in any parish.39 The information concerning the
filing would then be transmitted to the central filing office under sec-
tion 9-407. 40 Georgia has recently adopted a similar arrangement.4'
III. How UNIFORM SHOULD THE UCC BE?
Some degree of uniformity is clearly desirable. But is uniformity
absolutely necessary with regard to all aspects of the UCC? As evi-
denced by the nonuniformity that currently exists in many sections of
34. CAL. COM. CODE § 9302(1)(g) (West 1990).
35. HAW. REv. STAT. § 490:9302(1)(h) (1985); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 810, para. 9-302(h)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-104 (West 1993); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 79-302(1)(h) (Supp. II 1994).
36. See generally Gerald T. McLaughlin, Security Interests in Deposit Accounts: Un-
solved Problems and Unanswered Questions Under Existing Law, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 45
(1988) (discussing problems with common-law methods of obtaining liens on deposit ac-
counts and suggesting deposit account financing be included in UCC).
37. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY
GROUP, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 REPORT (Dec. 1, 1992).
38. CALIFORNIA SENATE FACT FINDING COMMITIEE ON JUDICIARY, SIxTH PROGRESS
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, Part 1, at 400 (1959-1961).
39. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-401(1)(b) (West 1993).
40. Id. § 10:9-401.
41. GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-9-401(1)(b) (Harrison Supp. 1993).
[Vol. 28:219
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
the UCC, the answer to the last question is "no." However, there is
little question that some of the nonuniform variations are trouble-
some, while others are not. How does one distinguish between the
two? The following criteria might be employed.
A. Is the Impact Primarily Local?
Some articles, such as Article 4A on wire transfers,42 envision
transactions that are frequently interstate. Indeed, three or more
states may be involved in a wire transfer because of the location of the
banks acting as intermediaries. Subjecting a wire transfer passing
through several states to nonuniform requirements would significantly
reduce the efficiency of the wire transfer, particularly if the variations
dealt with the actual mechanics of the transfer.
On the other hand, the bulk sales law in revised Article 6, that
now limits the application of Article 6 to the state of the transferor's
chief executive office,43 addresses a much more localized transaction.
Original Article 6, under which the laws of several states might need
to be complied with,44 suffered greatly because of the nonuniformity
among jurisdictions.
Under revised Article 6, compliance with the bulk transfer re-
quirements is focused on the laws of a single state.4 The parties in
that state are presumably familiar with any nonuniform provisions and
the infrequency of bulk transfers minimizes the need for out-of-state
creditors to constantly monitor the laws of other jurisdictions. In such
a situation, local variations do not have as significant a negative
impact.
B. Does the Variation Affect the Formation, Validity, Operation, or
Enforcement of the Contract?
Variations that affect the formation, validity, or operation of a
contract are particularly troublesome. For instance, California's origi-
nal version of section 9-102(4), which prohibited nonpossessory, non-
purchase money security interests in the inventory of a retail
merchant,46 created a trap for the unwary and ran counter to the nor-
mal expectations of the parties.
42. U.C.C. § 4A-206 (1990 Official Text).
43. U.C.C. § 6-103(1)(b) (1989 Official Text).
44. See id. § 6-103 (1989 Official Text).
45. See U.C.C. § 6-103 (1990 Official Text).
46. CAL. COM. CODE § 9102(4) (West 1964) (amended by CAL. COM. CODE § 9102(4)-
(7) (West 1990)).
November 1994]
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On the other hand, variations as to available remedies are less
problematic, at least in some circumstances. For instance, the ability
of a customer in a letter of credit transaction to enjoin honor of a
letter of credit in the event of fraud in the underlying transaction does
not affect the letter's basic operation. Indeed, the availability of in-
junctive relief is an exception to the independence principle that nor-
mally governs the operation of letter of credit law. Accordingly, the
failure of a state to adopt that exception does not detract from the
normal operation of a letter of credit.
C. Does the Variation Grant the Parties More Flexibility?
If the variation permits the parties more freedom or convenience
in structuring their transaction without curtailing their ability to struc-
ture the transaction as if the variation did not exist, it is hard to argue
that the variation negatively impacts interstate commerce. For in-
stance, the ability of a debtor to grant a security interest in deposit
accounts under the UCC in California47 and several other states48 can
only be viewed as positive, at least from the Article 9 perspective.
Out-of-state debtors and secured parties who structure their transac-
tions in California without regard to the California variation will not
have their expectations upset. They will only have experienced the
extra inconvenience of complying with the common-law requirements
for liens on deposit accounts which they would have faced in most
states.
Similarly, Louisiana49 and Georgia50 have filing systems under
Article 9 that permit filing at any local filing office. Because they have
statewide effect, however, they will not disadvantage any out-of-state
secured party who, unfamiliar with the system, files only with the cen-
tral filing office or with both the central filing office and multiple local
offices.
Of course, when these "beneficial" variations become the major-
ity rule, it is the uniform version which might be deemed to be restric-
tive and a pitfall for the unwary.
D. Presumption in Favor of Uniformity
Even if a proposed variation is not problematic under the above
criteria, there should be a rebuttable presumption in favor of uniform-
47. CAL. COM. CODE § 9102 (West 1990).
48. See supra note 35.
49. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-401 (West 1993).
50. GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-9-401 (Harrison Supp. 1993).
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ity for uniformity's sake. Variations, even those which are not prob-
lematic in their impact on individual transactions, nevertheless create
certain inefficiencies and expense, both in terms of the need to edu-
cate lawyers and judges as to their existence and the need to analyze
the impact of the nonuniformity. However, this presumption in favor
of uniformity should be able to be overcome for compelling reasons.
California lawyers, as well as lawyers in other states, have been
known to defend their local variations as being the "better rule."
Clearly the better rule, if it is indeed significantly better, should be
adopted if it is not problematic under other criteria, such as those sug-
gested above. However, the characterization of a variation as the bet-
ter rule is often subjective. In the real world, there may be two-or
more-solutions to a particular problem addressed by the UCC, and
it is a matter of legitimate debate among reasonable lawyers as to
which solution is the better.
This difficulty in characterizing one solution as better than an-
other is highlighted by the process by which both the original UCC
and the subsequent uniform revisions have been and are currently
drafted. The drafting committees consist of knowledgeable commis-
sioners from the NCCUSL who receive advice, comments, and exhor-
tations from various advisors and observers. All of the players are
knowledgeable, talented, and committed to producing a good final
product. Many of the players also have substantial practical daily ex-
perience on the topics upon which they are commenting. Neverthe-
less, the factual basis for many of the arguments for or against the
choice of particular rules is usually anecdotal. Seldom is there any
scientific or methodical study underlying the factual assertions made
in support of the choice of one solution over another. Because of the
lack of hard facts or statistics, it is hard to say that one solution is
"better" than another, even if the parties agree on a common goal.
One of the reasons for the lack of empirical evidence with regard
to various proposed solutions is that one cannot study the impact of a
particular rule unless the rule is actually in effect. If a proposed solu-
tion has never been implemented in any jurisdiction, one can only
speculate as to its consequences. If one can only speculate, it is hard
to argue that a proffered solution is in fact the better rule. Absent this
empirical evidence, the presumption should be in favor of uniformity.
IV. INJUNCTIONS AND LETrERS OF CREDrr
One of the most frequently touted strengths of our federal system
is the freedom of individual states to experiment with various solu-
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tions. If New York and California adopt different legislative solutions
to the same problem-assuming other factors are generally equal-
one would anticipate that after some time the experience in the two
states could be compared to determine if in fact one rule is better than
the other.
An experiment as to the better rule for dealing with the possibil-
ity of fraud in the letter of credit context has been underway in Cali-
fornia since its original adoption of the UCC in 1963. The official
version of the text of section 5-114(2)(b) reads as follows:
(b) [I]n all other cases as against its customer, an issuer act-
ing in good faith may honor the draft or demand for payment
despite notification from the customer of fraud, forgery or
other defect not apparent on the face of the documents but a
court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such honor.51
The California Legislature deleted the underscored words at the end
of subparagraph (b).52 The reason for this significant omission is
stated in the commentary to California's Commercial Code section
5114:
"By giving the courts power to enjoin the honor of drafts
drawn upon documents which appear to be regular on their
face, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws do violence
to one of the basic concepts of the letter of credit, to wit, that
the letter of credit agreement is independent of the underly-
ing commercial transaction.
53
California's experiment has been instructive. Courts throughout
the rest of the country have struggled with the level, degree, and type
of fraud necessary as a basis for an injunction under section 5-114.54
Many of these non-California courts have broadly defined "fraud" 55
or have ignored the non-UCC requirements for injunctions, thus ful-
filling the original California prophecy that, unless injunctions were
prohibited, the independence principle would be seriously eroded.
In contrast, California has had very few cases dealing with injunc-
tions under section 5-114. When an applicant seeks an injunction,
most banks cite the nonuniform version of section 5-114 and the Cali-
fornia legislative history in their motions for summary judgment.
51. U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b) (1990) (emphasis added).
52. See CAL. COM. CODE §5114(2)(b) (West 1964).
53. Id § 5114 cmt. 6 (quoting CALIFORNIA SENATE FACT FINDING COMMITrEE ON Ju.
DICIARY, SIXTM PROGRESS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, Part 1, at 337 (1959-1961)).
54. JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LmrERS OF CREDrr I 7.04(3)(b) (2d ed. 1991).
55. Id
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More importantly, counsel for applicants routinely advise them that,
even if they may eventually be able to prove fraud-usually with the
assistance of drawn-out discovery-the California statute presents a
major roadblock. As a result, many applicants do not even make the
attempt to get an injunction. Accordingly, the independence principle
has not suffered the same challenges as it has in other states.
The Author is not aware of any evidence that the diminished abil-
ity to obtain injunctions in California has either promoted fraud or
permitted applicants to be defrauded under letters of credit. The few
reported California cases involve situations where the alleged fraud
would be in a gray area under a narrow definition of fraud.
In the Article 5 revision process, the rationale of proponents in
favor of retaining injunctive relief against fraud has been that it is im-
portant to prevent fraud. The proponents acknowledge that some
courts have not correctly understood the proper standards for the im-
position of injunctions under section 5-114, but they argue that recent
cases now evidence a more informed view on the topic. The propo-
nents further opine that clarification of the standards in revised Arti-
cle 5 would ensure that courts would not misunderstand what the
proper standard should be.
Many California lawyers are now willing to accept this argument,
particularly given the stricter standards in proposed revisions to Arti-
cle 5. Others still contend that the original California prohibition on
injunctions is the better rule.
Even if California is willing to permit injunctions against honor,
many Californians involved in the Article 5 revision process neverthe-
less believe that the proposed uniform version goes too far with re-
gard to the time during which injunctions may be granted. To simplify
a complex topic, a change in the definition of "honor" clarifies that an
injunction can be granted up to the actual time that the issuer pays an
accepted time draft or deferred payment obligation. Letters of credit
can involve either (1) a sight. draft or demand, which will be paid
promptly after the issuer determines that the documents submitted
under the letter of credit are complying; or (2) a time draft or a de-
ferred payment obligation under which payment is not due until a
specified time (often ninety or 180 days) after the issuer determines
that the documents submitted are complying. For ease of reference,
the term "acceptance" will be used to mean acceptance of the docu-
ments. In the first scenario-involving a sight draft or demand-ac-
ceptance and honor are substantially contemporaneous. Under the
second scenario-involving a time draft or deferred payment obliga-
November 1994]
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tion-a significant time period can intervene between acceptance and
honor.
Many California lawyers involved in the Article 5 revision pro-
cess believe that, although preacceptance injunctions may be appro-
priate, postacceptance injunctions are not. The proposed revisions to
Article 5 would permit postacceptance injunctions up to the time of
final honor. 6 These different views as to postacceptance injunctions
will be referred to as the "California Proposal" and the "Majority
Proposal.
57
The proponents of the Majority Proposal argue that, so long as
there is an opportunity to prevent payment to a true "fraudster," the
courts should have the injunctive power to do so. In their view,
prohibiting injunctions will encourage fraud.
The proponents of the California Proposal are not in favor of
condoning fraud. The issue is whether the attempt to enjoin the true
fraudster from getting paid is worth the risk of the potential prolifera-
tion of cases in which there will be alleged but not actual fraud
("merely alleged fraud"). After acceptance it is very probable that a
true fraudster will immediately discount its accepted time draft or de-
ferred payment obligation to an innocent party. Thus, promptly after
acceptance, the likelihood of enjoining a true fraudster diminishes sig-
nificantly. At the same time, applicants usually do not receive goods
until after acceptance. Although an applicant may discover garbage
instead of the anticipated goods upon opening the shipping crates, the
more common scenario in a dispute is that the goods are not quite
what the applicant anticipated-that is, a routine contract dispute.
Experience has shown that applicants-or their lawyers-are very ad-
ept at elevating routine contract disputes into claims of fraud.
In short, the proponents of the California Proposal feel that the
deterrence of cases involving merely alleged fraud outweighs the like-
lihood that a true fraudster will be able to perpetrate a fraud because
of the inability of California courts to issue injunctions. Accordingly,
the proponents of the California Proposal believe that it is the better
rule for proposed section 5-109(b)(1).
While the proponents recognize the desirability of uniformity,
they also believe that nonuniformity may be warranted under the cri-
56. There are some exceptions, particularly with regard to the interplay between Sec-
tion 4-303 and Article 5.
57. The California Proposal is also supported by a number of non-California lawyers
and bankers as being the better rule. Because the most vocal proponents are from Califor-
nia, however, the proposal has been identified with California.
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teria discussed in Part III. First, although the beneficiary may not be
local, California's nonuniformity on injunctions will not adversely af-
fect the beneficiary. Any negative impact will be on the applicant,
who in most cases will be located in California if the letter of credit is
issued in California.
Second, nonuniformity with respect" to proposed section 5-
109(b)(1) will not have an adverse impact on the operation of pro-
posed Article 5. Proposed section 5-109 is an exception to the inde-
pendence principle. If California has a narrower exception, it will
enhance-not detract from-the independence principle.
Third, time drafts and deferred payment obligations permit appli-
cants to obtain seller credit even when a letter of credit is used.
Under the Majority Proposal, the increased likelihood that applicants
would seek injunctions because of merely alleged fraud would cause
beneficiaries to curtail the credit extended to applicants. Thus, the
California Proposal actually encourages beneficiaries to extend credit
to applicants and creates greater flexibility in the underlying
transaction.
In summary, the proponents of the California Proposal believe
that the California experience with its nonuniform version of section
5-114 may warrant continued nonuniformity with regard to postac-
ceptance injunctions.
V. FEDERAL LAW
It is often argued that ultimate uniformity among the states on
commercial issues could be achieved more efficiently by enactment of
a federal statute. 8 Federal statutes not only preempt the possibility of
local variations but also resolve the problem of different enactment
dates in various states. Others have persuasively argued that, notwith-
standing some of the advantages of federal legislation, federal legisla-
tion is a much less desirable product than that created by the
NCCUSL.5 9
Even at the federal level, legislators have become more cognizant
of the need for local variation. Many federal statutes now permit indi-
58. See, e.g., David M. Phillips, Secured Credit and Bankruptcy: A Call for the Federali-
zation of Personal Property Security Law, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 54-57 (1987).
59. See, e.g., Neil B. Cohen & Barry L. Zaretsky, Drafting Commercial Law for the
New Millennium: Will the Current Process Suffice? 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 551, 557-62
(1993); Fred H. Miller, Is Karl's Kode Kaput?, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 703, 705-06 (1993).
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vidual states to opt-out of federal schemes under various conditions. °
Congress has recognized that individual states may have strong local
reasons for adopting a different solution to a particular problem. Un-
fortunately, the ability to opt-out under many of these federal statutes
is often limited to state legislation adopted within specific time or
other constraints. 6' If a time deadline passes, the state no longer has
the ability to address a particular problem differently than that dic-
tated by Congress.
The UCC, on the other hand, permits ongoing experimentation
with different solutions. For instance, although the basic structure of
the filing system under Article 9 (either central filing only or central
and local filing) has been a cornerstone of the UCC for decades, Loui-
siana62 and Georgia63 have been able to take advantage of technologi-
cal advances to create a "new, improved" filing system which
logistically would not have been possible in the early stages of the
UCC. Other states will be able to study the strengths and weaknesses
of this new filing system and further refine it. Although the desirabil-
ity of uniformity in filing systems should caution states against taking
a freewheeling approach to variations, the desire for uniformity
should not stultify a carefully considered experiment.
This ability to experiment with different solutions has proven to
be one of the greatest strengths of the UCC as compared to federal
legislation. Local experimentation permits the UCC to be a living and
growing body of law. So long as nonuniform variations are carefully
considered and maintained within appropriate bounds, it is possible to
achieve most of the advantages of uniformity without creating rigidity.
VI. CONCLUSION
To respond to the question addressed in the title of this Sympo-
sium, Is the UCC Dead, or Alive and Well?, the answer is that it is
"alive and well," particularly because the UCC is flexible enough to
achieve uniformity in basic structural issues while permitting local var-
iations to address different and changing circumstances. To answer
the question addressed in the title of this Essay, the answer is that one
60. Norman Silber, Why the U.C.C. Should Not Subordinate Itself to Federal Authority:
Imperfect Uniformity, Improper Delegation and Revised Section 3-102(c), 55 U. PrrT. L.
REv. 441, 481 (1994).
61. See e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(b)(2) (1988).
62. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:9-401 to -407 (West 1993).
63. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 109A-9-401 to -407 (Harrison Supp. 1993).
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size, with judicious alterations as appropriate for different seasons and
local requirements, should fit all.
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